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Naïve Thoughts on the Paradox of Gödel
Philip J. Davis
Division of Applied Mathematics
Brown University
Providence, RI 02912
EPIGRAPH

You can’t get there from here.
The classic Sam Loyd “Fifteen Puzzle” consists of fifteen movable and numbered square counters placed
in a random order in a four by four square frame. One
is allowed to slide a counter into an empty space, and
the goal is to arrive at the natural ordering of the
counters from a given initial arrangement by a sequence of such slides.
Theory shows that starting from half of the possible
original positions of the counters, the puzzle is solvable while from the other half it is insolvable. But a
simple interchange of any two counters will alter the
puzzle from solvable to insolvable or vice versa. Embedding the board in three dimensions makes the
puzzle always solvable.
***
THE IMPETUS

The impetus for this paper came from a novel by
Apostolos Doxiadis, Uncle Petros and Goldbach’s Conjecture. In the novel, Petros, a mathematician, has set
his heart on solving the Goldbach Conjecture. Failing
and deeply disappointed, Petros takes psychological
refuge in the possibility offered by Gödel’s Theorem,
that the problem be insoluble. After reviewing this
novel for the SIAM NEWS, I began thinking about my
own reactions over the years to the Gödel Theorem
and to one particular aspect of it.
ON THE WORD “NAÏVE” IN THE TITLE

The amount of material related to Gödel’s Theorem is
enormous: it is far beyond anyone’s ability to know it
all or understand it. And the Web has multiplied the
chatter and blurred it into an incoherent mass of
thoughts.
I will approach my topic as I have experienced it in
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my professional career as an applied mathematician
and as a writer. This is the meaning of the word
“naïve” in my title.
WHAT IS THE PARADOX?

Simply stated, the Paradox of Gödel is this: although
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem has been touted in
some quarters as the most significant mathematical
achievement of the 20th century, it seems to be of little
significance to the bulk of research mathematicians.
Why is this the case?
What is Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem? In nontechnical language one might say: if a mathematical statement has been asserted that seems to make sense, it
may not be possible to prove whether the statement
is true or false.
Example: A claim has been made that there are an infinite number of 0’s in the decimal expansion of π. At
the moment, it is not known if this is true or false or if
it is undecidable.
I like to put the incompleteness theorem this way:
given a mathematical “there” and a “here,” you may
not be able to get there from here.
Slightly more technically: arithmetic is not completely
formalizable. For every consistent formalization of
arithmetic, there exist arithmetic truths that are not
provable in that system.
“There will always be arithmetic truths that escape
our ability to fence them in use the tools of rational
analysis” (John Casti).
In what follows, I will use the abbreviation GIT to
designate the Gödel Incompleteness Theorem, or more
generally, any of its closely related theorems or equivalent formulations.
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THE ROMANCE, THE HYPE, AND THE ICONOGRAPHY
SURROUNDING GÖDEL’S THEOREM

“An astounding and melancholy revelation” (Ernest
Nagel and James R. Newman, Gödel’s Proof, 1958).
“The most decisive result in mathematical logic”
(Boyer, A History of Mathematics, 2nd ed.).
“Amazing, shattering” (Morris Kline, Mathematics: The
Loss of Certainty).

supported from the outside. Derrida showed that
there is no outside” (New Republic Magazine, Feb 7,
2000).
There are web chats galore on the single topic of “False
Applications of the GIT,” although what is a “false”
application of mathematics and what is a “true” application defy formalization, let alone common agreement.
SOME “APPLICATIONS” OF THE GIT

“Mind boggling. One of the pinnacles of human intellectual achievement. Basis for a whole host of related developments in philosophy, computer science,
linguistics, psychology. Mankind will never know the
final secret of the universe by rational thought (Casti,
Reality Rules, II).
“Only Einstein’s theory of General Relativity represents an accomlishment of comparable intellectual
grandeur” (Berlinsky, Black Mischief).
“GIT a part of a ‘golden braid’ of math , art and music
that penetrates the very nature of human consciousness. Gödel-numbering has opened up vast new
worlds” (Douglas Hofstadter, Gödel, Escher and Bach).
One can find statements in semiotics, theology and
eschatology that are based on or allude to the GIT as
well as references to Gödel in novels:
The philosophers at the great universities
were, without exception, failed mathematicians. When they were not examining much
of the vocabulary of civilized discourse to conclude that it, after all, lacked meaning, they
muttered Gödel, Russell, Hilbert, liking to
imply that they themselves had chosen philosophy over mathematics to give themselves
a wider, though related intellectual field
(Renata Adler, Speedboat).
One can find references to Gödel in literary criticism
where, according to Simon Blackburn’s review of
Umberto Eco’s Kant and the Platypus, “prominent literary intellectuals often like to make familiar reference to the technical terminology of mathematical
logic.”
One such person is reported as opining that “Gödel
showed that every theory is inconsistent unless it is
12

I use the word “application” here to mean simply that
an argument of some sort has been put forward based
in some way on the GIT. The GIT serves as a point
d’appui for both specialists and the laity.
GIT suggests there is no final theory of physics
(Stephen Hawking).
GIT suggests that physics—identified with mathematical physics—might be inconsistent.
GIT suggeststhat not everything that is technically desirable is technically possible (Jerome Wiesner).
GIT suggests that “whether we admit it or not all (political, social, military) actions end in the logic of triage (i.e., judgements of priorities of action)” (Hans
Magnus Enzensberger, Civil Wars, 1994).
GIT suggests humans are not computers. Creativity
and intuitive powers are not the product of computer
programs (Roger Penrose).
(This last position has been seriously questioned by
Murray Gell-Mann.)
“I would be skeptical about the use of the GIT (as in
Penrose, 1991) for arguing the limitations of any kind
of intelligence” (Steve Smale).
GIT suggests that mathematics will become more and
more experimental (Chaitin).
GIT suggests that the foundations of mathematics both
philosophically and technically must come to grips
with stochasticity (i.e., the probabilistic element) (Gregory Chaitin, David Mumford).
GIT suggests that there may be a “high level way of
viewing the mind/brain, involving concepts that do
Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal #24

not appear on lower level” (Donald Hofstadter).
GIT suggests that mystical experiences may be the
only road to absolute knowledge (Paul Davies).

“I’ve been to many mathematical lectures and scientific meetings all over the world. Not once did the
name of Gödel come up.”
Another colleague told me:

GIT suggests that since “the consistency of mathematical systems becomes an incalculable question. Thus,
even the exercise of mathematics involves an act of
faith” (John Polkinghorne, Physicist and Anglican
Priest, One World).
From these last two quotes, it is an easy step to say
the GIT suggests that God exists.
GIT suggests that “a religion based on a plurality of
religions may leave us forever struggling with an
Axiom of Religious Choice” (Sarah Voss, mathematician and minister, What Number is God?).
In a totally different direction, GIT may give aid and
comfort to the creators of computer viruses:
“For most plausible definition of ‘virus’, it is likely
that the GIT blocks the possibility of writing a program that accepts all non-viruses and rejects all viruses” (Ernest Davis).
Thus, while each type of virus may be overcome on
an individual basis, no panacea can be found. If the
use of the word “virus” in both medical and computer
contexts is more than mere verbal play, the GIT may
suggest that a universal medical cure may be an impossibility.
Finally, there are features or “applications” of GIT that
feed into psychology. The nicest, most amusing exposition of this occurs in Apostolos Doxiadis’ novel referred to above..
THE PAST AND PRESENT INDIFFERENCE OF THE
MATHEMATICIANS TO THE GIT

If the GIT has caused turbulence in philosophy, if it
has caused earthquakes in logic, if discussions of the
GIT clog the printed page and the websites, how can
it be said that GIT is of little significance? And yet,
despite the storms that have raged and opinions altered, research mathematicians—with the possible
exception of a few number theoreticians—have little
regard and less use for the GIT.
One colleague put it this way:
Humanistic Mathematics Network Journal #24

“I’ve never lost any sleep over the GIT. But I’m sure
that Hilbert did.”
Therein lies the paradox.
More generally, of course, research mathematicians
have had little use for mathematical logic or for the
philosophy or history of mathematics. None of these
is required knowledge for a Ph.D. in mathematics (nor
hardly even for computer science). The idea, for example, that mathematics proceeds rigorously and rigidly from assumptions to conclusions by a set of allowed logical steps, simply does not correspond to
the way that mathematics is either discovered, developed, accepted, justified, applied or presented.
If someone points out that, in principle, all accepted
mathematical proofs can be written out in the manner of Russell and Whitehead’s proof that 1 + 1 = 2, I
would say the phrase “in principle” is one of the
weaseliest expressions in the vocabulary of intellectuals. In principle, a contemporary Robinson Crusoe
thrown naked onto an island well supplied with all
raw materials could produce an automobile that
worked.
Mathematicians work using traditional materials and
guidelines and have their own criteria for acceptance.
A real conceptual or metaphysical breakthrough occurs perhaps every fifty years. Afterwards, the logicians and philosophers move in and tell the world
what, exactly, the mathematicians have been doing.
Mark Steiner comments on the sociological phenomenon of mathematicians who ignore logic completely
in their description of the history and philosophy of
20th century mathematics and yet cite the GIT as one
of the most important recent results. His recently appeared The Applicability of Mathematics as a Philosophical Problem does not mention the GIT.
While the GIT is a piece of mathematics created along
traditional lines, but applied to mathematics self-referentially, it must be regarded as an “inside job.” On
the other hand, since it seems to limit what mathema13

ticians will ever be able to accomplish, limiting the
independence of mathematical action, it is also an
“outside job.”
Numerous people have walked away from certain
parts of mathematics, either for conceptual or for utilitarian reasons, e.g., measure theory. They do not accept it. It has no gut meaning for them nor relevance
to their scientific work. The GIT paradox is part of
this phenomenon.
THE GIT AND THE FAMOUS UNSOLVED (OR ONLY LATELY
SOLVED) PROBLEMS

In Doxiadis’ novel, his hero uses GIT as an excuse for
calling quits to his intense labors on the Goldbach Conjecture.

room. It can also do the reverse. This is part of the
paradox and adds to the unique status of the GIT. It
would be impossible to make such wide claims for,
e.g., Gershgorin’s theorem in matrix theory, or indeed
for any of the theorems employed routinely in daily
research. One would have to go back to the mental
world of the Pythagoreans or neo-Platonists (ancient
or contemporary) to find statements, contexts and attitudes of equal popularity.
One might very well call such a piece of mathematics
a fundamental symbol or myth in the sense of the psychologist Jung. Jungian archetypes carry many interpretations; it is also the case that many explanations
have been advanced for the Paradox of Gödel.
A BASKET OF EXPLANATIONS OR DENIALS

The mathematical world is full of unsolved problems My object now is to record a wide variety of reasons
and conjectures. Most conjectures fail to gain notori- that have been given to explain the Paradox of Gödel
ety, primarily because they
and then to set forth my
are not associated with a
own naive reasons.
“great name.” Mathematicians lose interest in them,
The GIT is equivalent to
One might very well call such a piece of mathso hence they are not
Turing’s theorem about the
worked over for long peri- ematics a fundamental symbol or myth...
unsolvability of the Halting
ods of time. Many of these,
Problem. I don’t think that
in number theory especially,
has any practical consehave been listed in such books as Daniel Shanks’ Solved
quences for real life computation which deals
and Unsolved Problems in Number Theory and Richard
with finite memory and finite computation
Guy’s Unsolved Problems in Number Theory.
times. It just shows the vast gap between what
is of metaphysical interest and practical interNeither of these books breathes the name of Gödel. It
est. Similar discrepancies abound in economis probably the case that most of the conjectures listed
ics and in fluid dynamics (Reuben Hersh).
in these books are decidable one way or another. The
difficulty or the depth of a conjecture can only be Tying the matter a bit more closely to the philosophy
guessed, but some measure of it may be gleaned from of mathematics, Hersh goes on to say:
the rewards ($25, $100, etc. 100,000 pre-WWI German
marks for Fermat) that are sometimes offered for a
It seems to me that most or all issues of mathsolution by some of the proposers.
ematical philosophy are important in some
sense independent of concrete specific exTHE GIT: ONE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL MYTHS OR ARCHETYPES
amples or applications.

❝

OF MATHEMATICS?

The fact that the GIT has contemporary applications,
implications or suggestions relative to a wide variety
of fields ranging from cognition, physics, and philosophy, to literature, theology, and politics, gives it a special and remarkable status among mathematical statements. The educated laity seem to be attracted to it as
iron to a magnet or as the devout to an icon. The name
Gödel can create a best seller or fill a large lecture
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For instance, is there really an infinite set, or is
it just something we imagine? From a philosophical viewpoint, this is a very basic, fundamental question. But for mathematical
work, it doesn’t make any difference, and
many mathematicians couldn’t care less about
it.
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Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem is a mathematical result with philosophical import. It
has limited mathematical import. Which
shows that mathematical and philosophical
import are not the same thing (Hersh).
For mathematicians, however, his [Gödel’s]
theorem was of marginal interest, since Gödel
worked with a far more formal definition of
proof than that to which they aspired (or still
do); so the separation of logic and mathematics continued largely unchanged (Ivor GrattanGuinness, The Rainbow of Mathematics).
I don’t find it [the paradox] paradoxical. You
can compare the GIT to Liouville’s proof of the
existence of transcendental numbers. It is an
example of a phenomenon, but it is of no help
for interesting number like e or π...One aspect
of the matter, not a direct consequence of the
GIT, but coming out of that development, is
the work on unsolvable decision problems that
has had a serious impact in certain fields, e.g.,
finitely presented groups (Martin Davis).
“The infinite is not the issue. It is the case that the GIT
has implications for finite memory and finite computation time” (Ernest Davis).
As far as applied mathematics goes, there is
considerable evidence that all scientifically
applicable mathematics depends on weak systems of set theory, even conservative over
arithmetic. No new axioms are necessary (Sol
Feferman).
Question: does Feferman’s observation about weak
systems constitute a descriptive hypothesis that limits the structure of physical theories just as the ChurchTuring Hypothesis (the Turing machine models all
possible computations) limits the nature of computation?
Most mathematicians don’t know or care
about logic and they see the GIT as a kind of
curiosity. It says nothing about the
undecidability of the problems they happen
to be working on. It provides no decision procedure for deciding beforehand whether a
given statement in mathematics is or isn’t de-
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cidable.
If they took the possibility of undecidability
seriously, if they agreed, for example, that with
probability one, a proposition given at random
is undecidable, they would be discouraged
away from the field. Mathematicians use their
insights, judgements, experience, to enable
them to focus on statements which turn out to
be decidable(John Casti).
A parallel from physics The response of mathematicians to GIT has been rather like the response of physicists to general relativity in the
period roughly from 1916-1960. Physicists
understood that Einstein’s results were in
some way quite fundamental, but because
general relativity seemed so definitely a singular achievement, physicists tended to ignore
its implications while ceremoniously paying
lip service to its grandeur...
Mathematicians are instinctively inclined to
assume that if the GIT and nearby results are
as important as logicians seem to think they
are, then it should be possible to use those results to discover something beyond the results
themselves. Nothing has yet emerged.
It is possible for a result to have immense importance for a discipline without leading to
anything interesting within the discipline
(David Berlinski).
It is not the case that GIT has contributed little to math
or computer science. A fair number of interesting problems have been proven unsolvable using a reduction
to the GIT. The best known is Hilbert’s Tenth Problem. There are numerous other results in number
theory, logic, computation theory, discrete math and
algebra, e.g., the Paris-Harrigton result which states
that the Ramsey theorem is not provable within number theory.
But just wait a bit! Things might change! Mathematicians have tended to ignore the GIT because it seemed
to have no connection to other parts of mathematics.
However, in the past twenty years, this has changed
somewhat. Harvey Friedman’s work has shown that
incompleteness theorems do have a very real mean-
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ing for number theory. But the fact remains that the
connection is weak in that it seems to point to nothing more than oddities in the structure of arithmetic.
This may or may not change.

and compass. Or, perhaps more significantly, the
“demonstration that Euclid’s Parallel Postulate” cannot be derived from the other postulates. Thus, there
appear to be many problems that were impossible to
solve in the way they have been formulated.

ANTI-GÖDELIAN DOUBTS

The GIT seems to have come as a surprise to neither
to John von Neumann nor to Norbert Wiener ( S.J.
Heims: “John von Neumann and Norbert Wiener”).
“The mathematical fraternities’ actual experiences
with its subject give little support to the assumption
of the existence of an a priori concept of mathematical rigor” (John von Neumann, The Mathematician).
Further down the spectrum there are anti-Gödelian
doubts:
“...it is commonplace that Wittgenstein rejected
Gödel’s proof [i.e., the GIT] because he did not, or even
could not, understand it” (Juliet Floyd).
The GIT is based on a chimera. The formalization of mathematics assumes its representation
in a set of recognizable signs that are beyond
questioning. The metamathematics however
is stymied by the ambiguity (incoherence) in
how those signs are actually viewed. The
metamathematical argument of the GIT collapses into confusion. Since the whole enterprise of formalization is not feasible, GIT is
redundant. No wonder mathematicians are
not bothered by it in their work (Miriam
Yevick).
THE WAY I SAW THE PARADOX

I first heard of the GIT around 1941, when I was a
college undergraduate. The GIT was then ten years
old. It caused no alarm in me. The bottom line seemed
quite reasonable. There were mathematical problems
I could not solve. I had heard that there were problems that no one had yet been able to solve. I knew
that there were problems, which, as stated, provably
had no solution.
An example: working in the plane, connect three
houses by curves, to the “electric, gas, and water
works” so that the curves do not intersect. (But in real
life we connect them in 3-d).
Another example: the squaring of the circle by ruler
16

This being the case, and arguing by analogy, GIT
seemed to me to be reasonable. As in the Fifteen Puzzle
cited in the Epigraph, you might not be able to get
“there” from “here.” Of course, these examples are
specific problems within mathematics and the GIT is
a theorem about theorems. Up a metalevel, or is it?.
But the proof of the independence of the parallel axiom
is a proof that there can be no proofs of dependence.
So the disparity of levels did not bother me. However
regarded, these analogies were strong enough for me.
(But not strong enough, apparently, for Frege, Russell,
Hilbert, et al. Is this yet another paradox?)
The idea of mapping formulas onto integers (Gödel
Numbering) seemed ingenious, but a bit dubious. The
Gödel numbers are so large! What kind of existence
can be attributed to them ? Do they really function in
the way that 1, 2, 3 do? Are these numbers being used
in different ways that really do not mesh with one
another or with the numbers of everyday arithmetic?
(I was, and still, am a “weak finitist.”)
And then came the coup de grace. Nothing but a complicated form of the Liar Paradox. Hence a self-referential swindle, a trick of language.
So while I was quite willing to accept the bottom line
of the GIT, I did not care much for the proof. I did not
need the whole Gödelian apparatus to convince myself that I couldn’t lift myself up by my own bootstraps either physically, mentally, or mathematically.
To add to my undergraduate skepticism, why was the
world famous logician W.V.O. Quine, with whom I
was even then studying mathematical logic, in the
Department of Philosophy at Harvard and not in the
Department of Mathematics? Obviously, the Harvard
Mathematics Department considered mathematical
logic to be irrelevant to their interests. In point of fact,
this was my first perception of the Paradox of Gödel.
MY CURRENT VIEWS

To discuss GIT and the Paradox, as Reuben Hersh
pointed out above, one might very well go into the
logic, the philosophy and metaphysics of mathematHumanistic Mathematics Network Journal #24

ics, metamathematics and cognition. What is a legitimate mathematical object, existentially? What are legitimate constructions or operations? What is truth?
What is proof? How can we recognize what makes
sense and what doesn’t? What does it mean to
“know”? What sense does it make to say that “it will
never be known whether the statement X is true or
false”? What does it mean to explain anything?
I shall bypass all these. I will not look for an explanation in terms of logical structures or the relative
strengths and weaknesses of axiom systems. I will go
for what might be called a historical view of the matter.
Toward this end, one should realize that at various
times actual mathematical practice has been other than
what it is claimed to be in an ideal and hence limited
sense. Over the years, I came to believe that the “standard” view of mathematics as consisting of hypothetical-deductive structures is a totally inadequate de-

scription of how I (personally) have understood and
internalized mathematics; how I applied mathematics to itself or to the outside world, or how I created
new mathematics.
Historically, there are many times and places in mathematics where mathematics has said “impossible,”
“no way.” Some of these impossibilities are hinted at
in the persistence of old mathematical terminology,
e.g., negative, irrational, imaginary numbers. Another
impossibility: no general formula involving a finite
number of simple operators and root extractions can
be found for the solution of the quintic equation. Yet,
the history of mathematics displays all these and
many, many more impossibilities and contradictions
(e.g., Heaviside’s operational calculus; Dirac’s delta
function) being bypassed, legitimized, co-opted, often by the method of context extension.
I began to wonder about the notion of proof, a process absolutely fundamental within a certain view of

Figure 1
The Hydra of Mathematical Impossibility is slain by the Hercules of context extension. (From Davis and Park, 1987.)
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mathematics, but proof was not identical understanding. Moreover, proof was subsequent to deciding that
initially there was something there to prove. And the
axioms were statements designed post hoc long after
a substantial corpus of mathematics was in place. (In
the case of arithmetic with Frege in 1884! Was there
no valid arithmetic till then?).I began to feel that what
was important was “mathematical evidence,”of which
proof is only one component.
I began to wonder about the concept known as consistency. To be inconsistent, mathematically speaking,
is to commit the primal sin. If one allows one contradiction, one can demonstrate anything at all. But can
one really say with absolute objectivity, finality, and
without relativistic allusions, what consistency consists of when there is a historical record of a constant
patching up of mathematical inconsistencies in a way
that makes them disappear? (Imre Lakatos)
An up-to-date example: consider the arithmetic system that is embodied in the popular and useful scientific computer package known as MATLAB. MATLAB
yields the following two contradictory statements:
(The symbol == means “is the equality true or false?”)
Input

Output

(1)

l e-50 == 0,

false

(2)

2 + l e-50 == 2,

true.

Yet, MATLAB arithmetic is a (finite, but large) mathematical structure. Operations can be carried out.
Certain inputs lead to certain outputs. These might
be called MATLAB truths or theorems. The computation itself is the proof or the validation of these truths.
They are deemed useful by the scientific community.
The structure has its own integrity in that it consists
of just what it consists of and it does just what it does.
Yet, when judged by certain other ideal structures
MATLAB embodies contradictions. While the God of
Consistency does not thunder nor shake the earth in
the presence of these logical irrationalities, one might
well ask whether these contradictions can lead to error or disaster when MATLAB is employed in physical applications. They can, but “knowledgeable” programming makes the likelihood small. In any case,
“ideal” mathematical computations (if indeed they
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can be carried out) might also lead to disaster.
Incidentally, I believe that Wittgenstein deplored “the
superstitious fear of mathematicians for contradictions” (quoted in Karl Menger’s Reminiscences of the
Vienna Circle).
Rejecting mathematical platonism, formalism,
logicism, and constructivism, I adopted a position that
has been called variously “social constructivism,”
“quasi-empiricism,” or “humanism.”
THE PARADOX OF GÖDEL: MY EXPLANATION

Is this an explanation? Not really; just some thoughts
conjured up by thinking about the paradox.
Mathematics is a living organism. The modes of its
discoveries, developments, justifications, and interpretations cannot be formalized in a few paragraphs–
if at all. They are time dependent and hence cannot
be set down once and for all.
The development of mathematics either as a manufactured or a discovered corpus, goes forward to a
great extent without set global goals. As it goes forward, year by year, what it turns up can be quite fortuitous, serendipitous, perhaps even interesting; in
such a case, the arrival at a theorem is automatically
accompanied by evidence of its validity or relevance,
sometimes even by its proof.
Mathematics moves forward from statements already
in place that suggest other statements. One of the goals
then becomes to arrive at a proof of the suggestions.
But the researcher is borne forward by a trust in a kind
of “principle of continuity” (which admittedly can be
dead wrong, see the “Fifteen Puzzle”) implying that
statements “close” to proved statements are themselves provable or disprovable.
In the older Eastern tradition, explicit proof is often
missing. In the Western tradition, the notions of what
is proof and what is provability evolved slowly and
simultaneously with the discovery or creation of much
material that was in fact provable. Alongside this,
there grew the dominating or establishment view of
mathematics as a logically deductive enterprise. The
steady supply of proofs and the demand for more,
interacting upon one another, grew together. The characterizing notion of mathematics as proved theorems
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grew with equal steps with the success in proving
those theorems even as the notion of what constituted
a valid proof altered and changed with time. The concept of what constitutes a proof has no finality; it develops alongside the material on which it operates.
Contemporary histories of mathematics present what
is often called “Whiggian history.” That is, they promote the current established view of mathematics as
deductive structures, and they interpret the mathematical past as leading inevitably to the established
present.

damental to all digital communication in the same
way the elementary particles of physics are fundamental to a Hawaiian wedding luau, there are some signs
that the algorithm may have to share the center stage
of technological and instructional emphasis or even
to retire to the wings.
Here are a few straws in the wind:

Computer scientist Peter Wegner thinks that in the
future the emphasis will shift from algorithmic models of computation to interactive models. We have now
reached the point where a single computer has beIf it should have turned out that a good many of the come a basic “elementary particle” of information instatements deemed interesting by mathematicians or teraction, to be combined with myriads of other indiscientists were unprovable,
vidual computers and acted
or undeterminable whether
on non-algorithmically by
they were unprovable, then
the whole exterior environthe view of the mathemati- The concept of what constitutes a proof has no
ment, human and non-hucal enterprise as it devel- finality; it develops alongside the material on
man.
oped in the 19th and 20th which it operates.
centuries, an enterprise that
“Interactive systems are
set increasing store by degrounded in an external reductive proof, would have become untenable.
ality both more demanding and richer than the rule
based world of noninteractive algorithms” (Wegner).
In such a case, mathematics would not have disappeared. It would be an art with a special vocabulary “The conventional metaphor [for computation] will
and modus operandi, a form of rhetorical discussion, be replaced by the notion of a community of interacta set of procedures, suggestions or rules as to how the ing entities” (Lynn A. Stein).
world might be organized, and the GIT would be both
true and irrelevant.
By way of a parallel within mathematics:

❝

AS REGARDS THE FUTURE.

In my opinion the most significant mathematical development of the 20th century has been the computer
in all its ramifications, mathematical, scientific and
social. Having done scientific computation in the preelectronic days as well as with contemporary veryhigh-level “tool kits,” I still tend to think of the computer as a “mathematical instrument.” But this view
and a related view that the computer is a “logical engine,” an “algorithm cruncher,” though historically
accurate, may now be as obsolete as the horse and
buggy. What is replacing it?
Programmed computation, i.e., algorithms, and deductive proof have common features. But the future
dominance of the algorithm–and the GIT is algorithmic in structure–has been questioned. Since it is fun-
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Mathematics has been regarded traditionally
as ‘theorems.’ It is now becoming the study of
structures. Until the 20th century, there have
been only two structures: geometry and arithmetic. Now there are many (David Mumford).
(MATLAB , mentioned earlier, is just one of the more
fairly recent ones.)
While by no means neglecting the algorithm, we must
surely add to the idea of structures the notion of
stochasticity as a prime element of the future composition of mathematics.
“The intellectual world as a whole will come to view
logic as a beautiful elegant idealization but to view
statistics as the standard way in which we reason and
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think” (David Mumford).
Working with the material of a structure and employing its rules, the mathematical culture goes forward
from “here” by successive steps and arrives at a
“there.” Often probabalistically and nonalgorithmically and even multivalently. The delivery
of the “there” from the “here” may be regarded as
proof in an extended sense. Whether the “there” is in
any way interesting or appealing or suggestive or
useful or whether it corresponds to a “there” desired
in advance is altogether another issue.
By now the ideas elaborated by Gödel, Church,
Turing, and Post have passed entirely into the
body of mathematics where themes and
dreams and definitions are all immured, but
the essential idea of an algorithm blazes forth
from any digital computer, the unfolding of
genius having passed inexorably from Gödel’s
Incompleteness Theorem to Space Invaders
VTT rattling on an arcade Atari (David
Berlinski: The Advent of the Algorithm: The Idea
that Rules the World).
The GIT is moving off center stage, a place it never
really occupied. Like the ideas of Freud which now
appear more in literature than in therapy, it will survive as an archetypal statement from which all kinds
of inferences–mainly non-mathematical–will continue
to be drawn.
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“The development of mathematics towards greater
precision has led, as is well known, to the formalization
of large tracts of it, so that one can prove any theorem
using nothing but a few mechanical rules.”
--Kurt Gödel
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